Alexander Pope's poem 'Dunciad' is flawed rather than enhanced by its duality of language and content. Despite successive attempts by other authors to salvage the poem's continuity, it fails to achieve coherence due to the abstraction of language needed for object reference. This abstraction interferes with the poem's ability to generate material effects on readers.
on more than one level. The first level one might describe as a level of deliberate artistry: the poet works in terms of play of wit, purposeful allegory, triumphantly pointed writing, in all of which we are made aware of the pressure of a highly critical and aggressive mind. But on another level the poetry works more mysteriously and obscurely: one seems to see past the personal names and topical allusion to a large fantasy-world, an imaginative realm which is infused with a powerful sense of gratification and indulgence. The first level is primarily stimulating to the mind, while the second works affectively in altogether more obscure ways. (3) I have already used the vocabulary of two levels to liken the Dunciad to a metaphor, but we might, by a simple translation, liken the poem to language itself, to a dream, or to the human psyche. Yet what strikes us about the Dunciad from Emrys Jones's and almost every other substantive description of it is that the two levels do not interpenetrate: they remain separate, each untranslated by the other. Unlike most metaphors, then, the tenor and vehicle of the poem seem mutually indifferent if not exclusive. Sensuousness (,primarily stimulating to the mind") and abstraction (working "in altogether more obscure ways") do not flow between the two levels, but flow instead between each level and some discrete capacity of the reader's. Whereas terms for metaphor in literary theory describe a fusion of sensuous and abstract, the vocabulary of two levels leaves us with no mechanism for explaining why the Dunciad is not simply two different poems inhabiting the same space.
This article will show that the pervasive mode of interpreting the Dunciad is dualist, holding it to be two unfused poems. Such a reading is not something we impose to explain the poem's aesthetic difficulty (even failure). Earlier this century, the poem's undigested doubleness was indeed considered an embarrassment for aesthetic criteria by formalists in Pope studies.(4) Various formalist bandages were applied to cover up the poem's holes, yet these were redolent of special pleading on behalf of organic unity. The dualism results not from our attempts to salvage sublimity within the poem's localism but from the very impossibility of Pope's historical project. Any mode of reading, from the most formalist to the most historicist, will fail to make the poem coherent because Pope failed to make the poem coherent. This incoherence, this unknitting of a continuous authorial intention, is no trivial matter. It is not the result of slippages in language, of the independent career of the poem's words; nor is it the case that a continuous poetic intention is in some light sense impossible. If any general feature of language is to blame, it is that words do not hook onto the world. And the poem's fascination only increases when we adopt a charitable stance toward Pope's intentions, understanding his massive attempts to suture words and the world. The poem's dualism results from Pope's ambitious and increasingly strident desire to engage in reference; why this project should fail is the question my article seeks to answer. ambition. He meant his poem to have material effects on real people, to "rid [him] of these insects."(5) Lytton Strachey wrote appreciatively, if figuratively, that our having been born after Pope means that "we run no danger of waking up one morning to find ourselves exposed, both now and forever, to the ridicule of the polite world--that we are hanging by the neck, and kicking our legs, on the elegant gibbet that has been put up for us by the little monster of Twit'nam."(6) Yet Pope never stopped revising, despite the straightforward mode of reference he practiced in the poem's early drafts. Why not? Pope never felt sure his work was done, the gibbet erected, the victim hung--if he had, the Dunciad would have been done, the poem spent. Instead, the little monster's poem grew into a big monster, its "universal darkness" effectively swallowing--as critic after critic has noticed--the little monster himself. And suddenly the final draft begins confusingly to refer to events and people long past with a fresh, almost manic, energy. (7) Pope almost certainly faced two insurmountable barriers to reference, one generic, one linguistic. The Dunciad may have practical failure built in: it is widely acknowledged that satire bakes no bread, nor does it unseat any governments.(8) The second barrier to reference is markedly general, having little to do with the Dunciad itself. According to the empiricist linguistic tradition that begins with John Locke, abstraction is unavoidable when we seek to refer to objects. Following out this line, we could shape the thought this way: abstraction of language causes a complicated failure of poetic reference; this in turn causes the poem's failure to achieve material effects on real people.(9) I. ABSTRACTION AND REFERENCE Allow me to examine this latter hypothesis at length. Proper names play the same role in Pope's Dunciad that they play in eighteenth-century theories of language: they anchor the poem in its particularity, just as for Locke and Berkeley proper names anchor words to the world first and last. A corollary is that proper names play the same role with respect to generality in Pope's poem as in these philosophical systems. A special case of reference, proper names convey meaning within the system as a whole where meaning becomes locked into the figurative aspects of language. This essay describes the resulting oblique relationship between the system and its initial "building blocks," that is, between general terms and proper names, which at its uneasiest becomes a relationship between two different orders of language, one figuratively and one causally connected to the world,(10) In essence, this relationship places some words, which have meaning, in tension with others, which have reference. All of these critiques name the source of the tension between meaning and reference as a variant of abstraction: abstraction is the mode by which the particular becomes the general, but it is also an ambiguous and self-contradictory feature of human psychology--one whose necessity Berkeley doubts in a thought-experiment about a "solitary man" who "shall never have had occasion to make use of universal signs for his ideas." (11) Here the analogy between Pope's poetic and an empiricist philosophical interest in the relation between particular and general terms hardens. The analogy between Pope's early Dunciads and Locke's system looks surprisingly apt when we realize that both writers distinguish between abstraction and figurativeness (a special variety of abstraction), and that both are committed to naming the latter as the true cause of rupture between reference and meaning. (12) I will return to Pope's uneasiness on this point later; Locke's uneasiness is somewhat easier to summarize. Locke's system initially accommodates both particular and general terms; he posits no essential conflict between reference and meaning. (13) He distinguished between abstraction and figure, seeking to understand the process by which proper names become general terms while stripping words of their sophistical power to "interpose themselves so much between our understandings and the truth which it would contemplate and apprehend that, like the medium through which visible objects pass, their obscurity and disorder does not seldom cast a mist before our eyes and impose upon our understandings." (14) For Locke, abstraction is the process that moves us seamlessly from the particular to the general, while figurativeness, a "perfect cheat," is the condition that prevents us from returning back down the same road. (15) From the earliest framing of the Dunciad to its final revision, Pope was vexed by how to translate figurative into causal language, meaning into reference. That they remain untranslated is the true origin of a widespread formalist view, cited earlier, that the Dunciad is aesthetically problematic. For if a poem has two incommensurable orders of language within it, one roughly corresponding to poetry and the other roughly corresponding to reference, it fails by definition to achieve internal consistency. The lack of internal consistency has been a surprisingly fertile source of anxiety for Pope's critics. Historically, formalist critics have been optimistic about Pope's aesthetic success, arguing that he eventually discarded all of the poem's undigestible matter, or what his nineteenth-century editor called the "inference(s) which Pope chose to found on the real actions of the various persons whom he satirizes," in favor of a higher, more sublime, aesthetic. (16) In the poem's early versions, so the argument goes, the poetic and the merely personal rival each other for space: personal satire and invective sit uncomfortably alongside material that Pope recycles from the Bible, Virgil, and Milton. Tending to prefer the Bible, Virgil, and Milton to "giant libel," most critics have discovered that in the last two versions of his poem (1742 and 1743) Pope committed an especially Virgilian maneuver. (17) He turned away from a low pastoral focus on hacks and dunces toward an epic focus on the sublime; he maturely substituted "theology for Grub-street" and "metaphysics for mock-heroic." (18) As Reuben Brower put it, "Pope, we might say, found in the New Dunciad the poem he had been half-consciously writing 'toward' for some ten or fifteen years."(19)
Can we really think of the "two levels" as coming together in the 1742-43 poem? Arguments that Pope made progress toward a unified poem seem borne out by his relative lack of hostility toward actual persons in the New Dunciad, the wealth of names in the earlier version having faded to ghostly blanks useful only for filling out the meter: "Great Shades of **, **, **, * "(20) Did Pope then simply lose the desire to correct the Dunces? Did his growing friendship with the clergyman William Warburton, whom he appointed his literary executor, allow him to seek a higher moral ground?(21) Or did he find such a slyly successful method of satirizing people that their identities have simply eluded generations of editors? His Twickenham editors note, for instance, that many Dunces in later versions of the poem never have been successfully identified (Twickenham 5:xxxii).
A case in point concerns the manifest difficulties in interpreting Paridel, "a lazy, lolling sort" whom Dullness finds "stretched on the rack of a too easy chair" (Twickenham 5:376). Paridel seems motivated not by satire but only by his difference from Spenser's wandering squire Paridel in book 3 of the Faerie Queene. The latter's restlessness in turn is not the antithesis to idleness but thematically appropriate to his Trojan lineage and connection to Brute, Aeneas's descendant and founder of Troy-novant (i.e., the City of London, seat of an increasingly mobile finance capital and of Dullness herself). A plausible interpretation would be that Pope uses the name Paridel to highlight how far we have fallen from the principle of epic motivation in Spenser. Epic motivation, on this view, is antithetical to the obscurity of the Dunce--his distance from the Aeneas figures in books 1 and 4, and his appearance in the poem after Dullness has left the City of London and claimed her seat at the palace of St. James--makes him seem a figure for lack of motivation. Are we to understand instead that Pope has someone definite in mind, a person whose identity would clear up the obscurity of the allusion and render such interpretive activity moot? I argue that Pope neither gave up his aim of satirizing particular people nor began to speak in some obscure Spenserian code. Instead, he paradoxically embraced his enemy, adopting the very abstraction that he had been battling as a feature of language in earlier versions of the poem, even divesting it of its pictorialism, its figurativeness, its concrete particulars. We know that Pope never abandoned his satirical aim: in the decade or so between the publication of the old and new Dunciads, he visibly sought a more intense way to achieve an effect on his targets than just referring to them by name (or personal attributes), a practice he optimistically called "hunting one or two from the herd." (22) In the New Dunciad, abstraction produces the effect that a wealth of particulars had failed to deliver. To Hugh Bethel, Pope wrote the following account of the New Dunciad: "And to give you ease in relation to the event of my poem; which, dealing much in General, not particular satire, has stirrd up little or no resentment. The it be leveled much higher than the former, yet men not being singled out from the herd, bear chastisement better, (like gaily slaves for being all linked in a string, & on the same rank)."(23) The New Dunciad, being general rather than personal, has failed to stir up the usual resentment; is this because it is a less effective piece of satire? Or, as Pope implies, is the lack of response to it evidence that it is a more effective piece of satire? If the latter is true, its greater effectiveness seems to have something to do with deindividuation: the poem's persons are stripped of their individuality and subordinated like "gaily slaves." By 1742 Pope embraced abstraction in order to get around language's figurative habit of not referring to things, not, as readers as different as William Warburton and Colley Cibber thought, because he finally had to admit the impossibility of corrective satire.
To understand why Pope embraced abstraction in the New Dunciad, we must understand how his letter to Bethel both continues some of his earlier obsessions and reverses some of his earlier poetic procedures. At each stage of the composition of the whole Dunciad sequence, Pope claimed to have increased the satiric pressure on his targets, who were neither fictional characters nor personified abstractions, but real people whose characteristics could be checked against Pope's representations. Pope Pope's defense of particular satire is notable partly because in the letter to Bethel eight years later (quoted above), he uses identical terms to argue for an opposite point of view. In the earlier letter, clarity of reference is a feature of particulars; correction comes about through greater clarity of reference and therefore through greater particularism. Pope's initial hypothesis about satiric effects is that the more particular he can be about a person the more closely he refers to that person; the more closely he refers to him or her the stronger the example he or she makes; the stronger the example the person makes the greater his or her motive (and that of Pope's readers) for "reformation."
Pope took a strongly particularist line in the prefatory advertisement to the Dunciad Variorum (1729): "Of the Persons it was judged proper to give some account: for since it is only in this monument that they must expect to survive... it seemed but humanity to bestow a word or two upon each, just to tell what he was, what he writ, when he lived, or when he dy'd. If a word or two more are added upon the chief Offenders; 'tis only as a paper pinned upon the breast, to mark the Enormities for which they suffered; lest the Correction only should be remembered, and the Crime forgotten" (Twickenham 5:8-9). How then did Pope come to reverse himself by substituting for a description of the condition of actual people a question about their condition: What is it to be a person? We sharpen this question when we realize what a great barrier abstraction erects against the kind of reference Pope intended, indeed how closely most theories of satiric correction entail a fantasy of being able to tack words directly onto the world by pinning a paper to a breast. Yet however powerful it is, this particularist fantasy contains the seeds of its own destruction.
When Pope abandons his particularist line, deciding to subtract instead of adding attributes, he leaves us with the following puzzle. Stripping a person of her attributes may be a hostile gesture; yet if one strips away too many attributes, a person ceases to be recognizable as a person; therefore the gesture no longer seems hostile but merely misguided. How, then, did Pope come to think that stripping people of all of their attributes was the best way to refer to the essence, not just of the kind or species, but of the particular persons reading his poems? How, in short, did Pope come to see abstraction as a way to achieve the very intensity of effect that particular references were formerly meant to deliver?
To answer this question we need to understand Pope's successive attempts (corresponding to successive versions of the Dunciad and to movements within each version of the poem) to tightly tether satiric correction to reference. We also need to understand his Lockean level of frustration with the pull of language toward figure, which imposes itself between the word and the world, deforming reference. Finally, we must try to understand how in the final drafts Pope's desire to have satire connect with its target, or to have meaning coincide with a referent, ends up promoting a situation in which it looks as though the world outside the poem has been annihilated.
II. REFERENCE AND THE DESCRIPTIVE CONTENT OF PROPER NAMES
It is a curious fact that Pope's optimism about proper-name references takes the same form as his pessimism about them. "Great Shades of **, **, **, *" (1742) is visually indistinguishable from many lines in the 1728 Dunciad, whose blanks were filled in by later versions of (and some spurious "keys" to) the poem: "**, **, and **, the wretches caught" (Twickenham 5:xx). Pope's Twickenham editors suggest that he was initially anxious about legal recriminations (Twickenham 5:xx), but a well-known loophole in eighteenth-century libel law specified that "innuendo," or "any word the referent for which was not immediately obvious when the word was taken out of context," did not count as evidence of a satirist's libelous intention. 
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Information Integrity shall have found them out, he will probably know no more of the Persons than before" (Twickenham 5:206). In distinguishing between catching the wretches and characterizing them, Pope distinguishes between reference and meaning. Yet I think the 1742 edition imagines the Dunces as fictional characters ("great shades") because Pope found it impossible to make his references stick. To borrow terminology from a recent account of fictionality in the eighteenth century, it is not that the Dunces are ontological nobodies, although we cannot find that out from reading the Dunciad. Rather, we are increasingly forced to fall back on characterizing them as social or intellectual nobodies while remaining agnostic about their real existence. A reader of all the poem's versions might find herself witnessing the birth of a fictional mode, as proper names gradually become unstuck from the Dunces' real selves. (26) As it happens, modern philosophy has sponsored at least four distinct ventures in proper-name theory, each of which has been committed to figuring out how proper names stick to their referents. They are (chronologically): the no-sense theory (J. S. Mill), sense theories (Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell), identifying (cluster) description theories (John Searle), and rigid designation/historical explanation theories (Saul Kripke, Keith Donellan). All presume the uniqueness of proper names: unlike general names such as "cow" and "jelly," which designate a plurality or a class, proper names designate only one object. Does this uniqueness entail a special set of rules for reference? Locke thought of general terms as the divergent case requiring explanation and rules; proper names are straightforwardly particular terms fitted to the particularity of things.(27) Yet post-Lockean philosophers have had no such confidence, unanimously finding that meaning is an obstacle to instead of a guarantee of true proper-name references. Thus Mill argues that proper names are necessarily meaningless--words become proper names as soon as they shed their connotations; they stop being proper names as soon as they acquire them again. (28) Translated into terms of art, Searle's problem means that one can never be sure one has caught the right wretch; periphrastic descriptions are exactly that--they speak around the person in question. Boileau shrewdly observes a certain "explicitness" in Horace's practice of naming his targets: "Horace is not contented with calling people by their names; he seems so afraid they should be mistaken, that he gives us even their sir-names; nay tells us the trade they followed or the employments they exercis'd: `We were glad to leave (says he) the town of Fundi of which one Ausidius Luscus was Praetor, but it was not without laughing heartily at the folly of this man, who having been a clerk, took upon him the airs of a senator and a person of quality.' Could a man be described more precisely?" (34) The case would be trivial if the 1728 version had provided no descriptive information about those to whom the blanks referred (other than, say, metrical cues), but, in fact, the blanks were incorrectly filled in despite a high degree of descriptive explicitness. For example, Dullness anoints Tibbald's head "And lo! her Bird (a monster of a fowl! / Something betwixt a H*** and Owl) Perch'd on his crown!"
In the earlier edition, a note appended to this line reads: "A strange Bird from Switzerland," suggesting that H*** is John James Heidegger, a Swiss theatrical impresario described as "the most ugly man that ever was formed." Yet because a Dublin edition had Hungerford (a lawyer and M.P.) for H***, Pope was made to add "a word or two more": "A strange bird from Switzerland, and not (as some have supposed) the name of an eminent Person, who was a man of parts, and as was said of Petronius, Arbiter Elegantiarum" (Twickenham 5:92).
Pope's initial note nudges his readers into picking out a name; he presumes that our stock of connotations-in-common is sufficiently predictable that we will supply the right name; yet he can deliver no guarantees. A foreign, independent-minded (or rebelliously disrespectful) group of readers ignore the clues, settling on another referent and setting in motion a train of connotations that becomes a permanent part of the poem's textual apparatus. The poem thus canonizes its own misreadings as connotations are heaped on connotations and two equally plausible referents compete for our attention. Moreover, as Aubrey Williams writes, the Variorum's notes exert a "continuous dehistoricizing pressure" on any single name, which "tends to attract to itself, to pull in, any suggestive meanings the poet may place in its vicinity." (37) Swift envisioned this escalating scenario when he read the 1728 Dunciad. He warned Pope against relying on his readers' common stock of connotations precisely because they would fail to grasp the poem's denotative reference; their failure, willful or not, would open the poem to their subversive misreadings: "The notes I could wish to be very large, in what relates to the persons concerned; for I have long observed that twenty miles from London nobody understands hints, initial letters, or town-facts and passages; and in a few years not even those who live in London. I would have the names of those scribblers printed indexically at the beginning or end of the poem, with an account of their works, for the reader to refer to .... I insist, you must have your asterisks filled up with some real names of real Dunces."(38)
The first doubt the Dunciad Variorum seems meant to answer is whether identifying descriptions deliver the right name; the unsatisfactory answer is that at most, they can nudge us in the direction of supplying it ourselves, and they open the poem to our misreadings. The second doubt is potentially much more serious: whether the name of any Dunce can deliver the person of the Dunce--a doubt, in short, about whether proper names refer at all. By analogy to the first doubt, we ought at most to suppose that names only point us toward the right person, not help us fasten onto him. But if we are correct about the second doubt, the
Modern Philology
-Reprinted with permission. Additional copying is prohibited. -
G A L E G R O U P
Information Integrity consequences for poetry are severe. The existence of the first doubt injures one particular poem, causing it to grow excrescences to cover its bruised spots. But the existence of the second doubt admits the inefficacy of corrective satire, thus nullifying the poem's purpose. Pope's fantasy is to pin a paper to the breast of each miscreant. Yet figurative language is such that we may always transfer our interest from the breast to the paper pinned to it, consigning ourselves to the realm of connotation and of general satire. This doubt takes us into the territory of fiction: Does it make any difference to the poem that it satirizes real people as opposed to creating composite portraits or fictional characters?
It is important to recognize that, prior to the most recent historicist turn (of which more in a moment), most twentieth-century criticism of the Dunciad has answered the last question with an emphatic "No!" Some of Pope's own statements also lead us to think that he would have answered that question negatively, although for reasons of his own. Pope wrote, for example, "Whoever will consider the Unity of the whole design, will be sensible, that the Poem was not made for these Authors, but these Authors for the Poem: And I should judge they were clapp'd in as they rose, fresh and fresh, and chang'd from day to day, in like manner as when the old boughs wither, we thrust new ones into a chimney" ( Yet while one school--roughly Mack, Wimsatt, Aubrey Williams--thinks that meaning is liberated by giving up the fantasy of reference, another thinks that meaning is constrained by giving up reference. Laura Brown, a proponent of the latter view, thinks that proper names in the poem are essentially separate from the persons they represent, and that they attract connotations to themselves; but she also thinks that the poem's formalism operates at a cost to meaning itself. She writes: "When proper nouns, noises and abstract qualities are listed as if they were objects, nothing can retain its autonomy, and here not only the persons of the dunces but human actions and discourse itself are reified."(42) Not only does the poem's formalism produce meaningless noise, but it does so disastrously by imitating the very materiality from which it is abstracted: in making abstract entities look like material ones, the poem's inside comes to resemble its outside (reified). . This last thought depends on the further presumption that since this is a poem, there must be a way to interpret it; in a historicist climate, one temptation will be to think that the best way to figure out what a poem means is to research its referents. (43) III. REFERENCE AND ANTIREFERENCE To test these hypotheses, let us examine the portrait of James More Smythe, who plays such an important, albeit passive, role as the main prize awarded in the contests of authors, stationers, and booksellers in book 2 of the Dunciad Variorum. I choose book 2 because the very difficulty of differentiating fictional from literal agents is patently connected to interpretation. Reuben Brower (a polemical formalist) has contrasted book 2 with book 4, finding the former wanting because its very openness to the world outside the poem infects the poem's agents, who come to seem thin and underrepresented: "The main weakness of Book 2 is obvious. We find it hard to care about the objects of the satire, in part,.., because they are so inadequately dramatized and so little `present' in the poetry. In part, too, because Pope rarely lifts our attention to the large moral and aesthetic concerns that give dignity and meaning to the satire of Book 4 (where it is worth noting, the characters are more often fictional and symbolic)." (44) Yet what exactly is the source of this porousness? One answer is that the characters in book 2 seem inadequate by some standard of fictionality that we can all recognize, perhaps one that comes into being around the time of book 4 (the early 1740s). A better answer is that the poem's characters seem inadequate by whatever standard we adopt. If we try to figure out who they are only by looking around inside the poem, we will soon happen upon glaring patches of indeterminacy; if, on the other hand, we slavishly fill in the background of each Dunce, his representedness in the poem mocks our efforts.
James More Smythe is a case in point. More is simultaneously a textual representation (a "copy") and a grotesquely inflated body; insubstantial and fat, his body formed from air and a container for hollow space. Yet whether he is a fat man or a phantom depends on one's position inside or outside the poem: the starveling bards who heft him up feel not his hollowness but his weight, while to the audience of classifying "criticks" More is merely "a copy of a Wit." Notice that it is these represented readers of the poem who "call" the phantom "More," as though dubbing him with a proper name from their own (imaginary) milieu. The portrait thus represents itself as being the sort of thing that has an outside, while remaining agnostic about the relationship between such apparent figure, Dullness is Juno, and the Booksellers fighting to get a piece of the phantom are Turnus. But this "key" makes interpreting the figure rather difficult--it implies a heroic distance between the real James More Smythe and his phantom equivalent to that between Aeneas and Juno's impersonation of him. In an action modeled unironically on that of her Latin predecessor, Dullness makes a fictional representation of More Smythe by straightforwardly copying him--outside the poem, More is a wit, inside the poem he is a copy of a wit. But if this is the reason that More counts as an allegory of Plagiary, then every Dunce must also count as an allegory of plagiary, and the phantom More is at once overly generalized and nonsensical (how do we account for the overall theme of the portrait, which seems to be the strange cubism of his body?). It would make more sense to ignore some of the notes directing us to interpret him as "Plagiary" and instead to follow other notes (predictably those written by the connotation-loving Scriblerus) directing us to interpret him as "stupidity" because his name, More, is derived from the Greek moros. Yet this doesn't help us out much either, since such punning is little more than name-calling. Far from making sense of the phantom More in formal terms, the connotations of his name provide us with a short stick to beat him with. Even if our sophisticated instincts about language make us skeptical about whether the stick will find its target, we must assume a target outside the poem to be hit. So we scrutinize the apparatus notes for clues, and find the portrait described in terms of a rather elaborate chiasmus: "Our author [was] obliged to represent this gentleman as a Plagiary, or to pass for one himself. His case indeed was like that of a man I have heard of, who as he was sitting in company, perceived his next neighbour had stollen his handkerchief. `Sir' (said the Thief, finding himself detected) `do not expose me, I did it for mere want: be so good but to take it privately out of my pocket again, and say nothing.' The honest man did so, but the other cry'd out, `See Gentlemen! what a Thief we have among us! look, he is stealing my handkerchief'" (Twickenham 5:101). As a third "key" to the figure, this story leads us to understand the complicated dance of permission and borrowing as a chiasmus, so that More is not so much impersonating himself as he is impersonating Pope. Pope confirms this by saying that he could either represent More as a plagiarist or let himself be represented as one; either More is a phantom of Pope or Pope is a phantom of More. More seems powerfully attracted to the poetry of chiasmus: the lines of Pope's that he steals are studded with that particular rhetorical figure. In trading the lines back and forth, Pope and More become locked in a dynamic that imitates the formal technique used in the very text in dispute.
A complicated dialectic of inside and outside, materiality and immateriality, structures More's portrait, connecting the reader's position to aspects of the representation that become available according to her interpretive agenda.
More changes dimension as we weave in and out of the poem: the farther inside the poem we go, the heftier More becomes, but the more he also becomes two-dimensional (a caricature). The farther outside the poem we go, the more he becomes both a literary imitation and a rich figure for Pope himself. Wherever we choose to locate ourselves (and Pope tantalizingly provides bait for us to snatch at one starting point or another), we are soon forced to confront the uncomfortable fact that our line of sight makes some of More's features clearer and others more opaque. The very difficulty of hammering out an interpretation has as a theme the interrelation of particular and general: the particular location yields a general sense of the portrait that is then frustrated by stray and insistent particulars. The phantom More is a character who is oddly meaningful with respect to certain attributes and meaningless with respect to others. The peculiarity of this situation is connected with the difficulty of figuring out what genre he belongs to: personifications, allegories, character progresses are determinate with respect to some properties and indeterminate with respect to others (and demand as a minimal requirement of the genre that each of the extant attributes relates to an overall theme). Even characters marked as realistic can be so described, as in this fascinating recent contribution to the way we think about the difference between fictional characters and real persons: "In the case of `Sherlock Holmes' we get an incomplete, possible, non-existent object, some of whose nuclear properties are: being a detective, catching criminals, smoking a pipe, etc. Typically, fictional objects will be incomplete, for the body of literature in question will not determine all of their properties. For example, it is not true that according to the Conan Doyle novels, Holmes had a mole on his left leg, nor is it true that according to those novels he didn't have a mole on his left leg... he is indeterminate with respect to that property" (emphasis in original). 
Information Integrity indeterminacy a set of blanks a clef that the poem's readers could fill in by historical investigation. But were we to take that route, we would not get very far in figuring out what the portrait means, since Pope blocks a clef questions off from questions of the portrait's meaning. Crucially, the portrait's meaning resists investigation: the more one tries to investigate it, the less meaningful it becomes (three "keys" and untold numbers of hypotheses later). We must rest content with our initial intuition that the portrait is a mix of meaning and nonsense, of conceptual clarity and incoherence. We must finally be chastened by the realization that what the More portrait means is relative to our shifting perspective (among other things, this explains why the portrait can be shown to provide limited but very real justification for each of the lines of Pope criticism canvassed above, from pure formalism to pure contextualism).
What I am proposing is that with the figure of More, Pope starts to reorient his satiric portraits so that they become objects existing in their own space, their apparent referentiality reduced to just another attribute. This reorientation happens, ineluctably, by stripping particulars of their authoritative grip on the real. Abstraction is the force that strips particulars of authority, creating a defensive shine around its newly won territory. The portrait of More defeats the distinction between reference and meaning by making apparent reference just one more source of meaning and not an especially privileged one. In the New Dunciad, Pope will take this development to its logical conclusion, evacuating his abstract entities of any recognizable pictorialism and thus bearing witness to the final defeat of figure by abstraction.
IV. THE NEW DUNCIAD--PRIVATE MEANING
Berkeley said of Locke's theory of how we frame universals that it is the "tacking together of numberless inconsistencies." (48) Warburton include a note explaining that the "force inertly strong" of Dullness that converts "broad hats" into a "black blockade .... alludes to the vis inertiae of matter, which, though it really be no power, is yet the foundation of all qualities and attributes of that sluggish substance" (Twickenham 5:340). A more scientifically tendentious way of putting the same thing is to say that accidents do not signify essences but are identical with them.
The fact that attributes are no longer a means of individuation, or a sign of anything at all, helps explain why the transition from the Dunciad of the 1720s to the Dunciad of the 1740s is a transition from a figurative mode to a nonfigurative mode. Yet abstraction is at the core of both modes. When critics used to think about such things, they argued that abstraction is the favored style of a neoclassical aesthetic while debating back and forth about whether neoclassical abstraction was at heart figurative or nonfigurative. Their arguments presupposed massive developments in the philosophy of language: historically, they argued, a neoclassical aesthetic depended on the Lockean reorientation of the relation between particular and general terms and other similar shifts. (49) Yet this reduction of the poem's "two levels" to one does not by itself produce a conceptually complete New Critical masterwork, as so many of the critics writing in the 1950s and 1960s thought. We have already seen in the case of the Paridel figure that the lack of a verifiable referent for many of the New Dunciad's "fictitious names" does not make the names any easier to interpret. In fact, the contrary holds: the end of reference signals the beginning of new, more intensely private forms of meaning. Now that particulars have lost their status as signs of the real, even the most public of names are reduced to objects of private obsession. A case in point occurs during one of the poem's longest set pieces, a Dunce's lament over his dead carnation CAROLINE, killed by a zealous birder indifferent to the fate of the "rose or carnation" beneath his bird (Twickenham 5:382). The meaning of the Dunce's grief, and of his rival Dunce's murderous carelessness, is the same. The first Dunce carefully husbands his flower, spreading its leaves within a paper collar and "throning it in glass" for better viewing, calling forth the praise of maids and youths. In a blazing public tribute to his queen, he names his flower after her, but as soon as he does so, his flower is killed. His obsessions blind him to the fact of his flower in the natural world, and to alternate perspectives, such as those of nectar-hunting birds. The second Dunce, a scientist who pledges his allegiance to the undisguised "naked fact," kills through absorption in his own particular.
What these Dunces murder through their private obsession is the public name. This tale matches some others scattered throughout the poem as an allegory of the privatization of meaning. Pope, increasingly subject to many of Dullness's other effects, falls victim to this one, too. Some proper names stand out boldly and clearly against the background of the "involuntary throng"--Chesterfield, Atterbury, Murray. We soon realize that Pope floats the names of friends, members of the Walpole opposition, belatedly praising them for their opposition to the "force inertly strong" of Dullness, who blots out distinctions between "true and false in individuals." To be praised is to have failed: in order to be named, a person must already have succumbed to Dullness. Read in light of Pope's private praise for failed public names, the Dunce with his CAROLINE becomes oddly aligned with his author. It seems out of place to celebrate the completion of Pope's intentions in a poem that so profoundly thematizes the "uncreating word"; with the passing of reference, we might find ourselves mourning the passing of meaning as well. The "two levels," however frustrating to some, keep meaning in play by keeping the hope of reference alive. (50) We nevertheless ought to doubt that Pope became cured of his fantasies of reference, however much it may have looked to his contemporaries as though he grew blindly absorbed in private meaning. Although Colley Cibber, upon getting wind of his hypostatization into king of the Dunces, mocked the existential futility of Pope's gesture ("You seem angry at the rain for wetting you; why then do you go out in it?"),(51) nevertheless I have quoted above Pope's letter to Hugh Bethel proclaiming the New Dunciad as a stealth weapon because it is unrecognizable as such. And, in fact, during the 1730s, his period of intensifying political satire, Pope grew more interested in hitting targets in verse, even to the extent of fantasizing about literally and mechanically doing so. London alderman John Barber wrote to Swift on the subject of the Lord Mayor's Day parade: "Mr. Pope and I were thinking of having a large machine carried through the city, with a printing-press, author, publisher, hawkers, devils, etc., and a satirical poem printed and thrown from the press to the mob, in public view... but your absence spoils that design." (52) Given this fantasy of shooting his poems out into the crowd like stones, Pope might have been pleased by the historical survival of his reputation as a poet able to produce material effects on real people. De Quincey wrote: "Pope finds himself unable to resettle the equilibrium in his nervous system until he has taken out his revenge by an extra kicking administered to some old mendicant or vagrant lying in a ditch." (53) But perhaps the pathos of his case is hit better by the poet Thom Gunn reflecting on 
G A L E G R O U P
Information Integrity occasional verse: "Later I had for a while a theory of poetry as `loot,' a prize grabbed from the outside world and taken permanently into the poet's possession. But of course it isn't taken, it continues out there in the world living its own independent existence, stepping from the tubetrain at a later stop, coolly unaware of all the furore it is causing." (54) (1.) For reasons that will become clear in this article, I believe we can hazard a comparison between the Dunciad and the structure of metaphor as influentially (and controversially) described by Donald 
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